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SURETYSHIP ON THE FRINGE: SURETYSHIP BY
OPERATION OF LAW AND BY ANALOGY
D. BENJAMIN BEARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most practitioners, particularly those who specialize in commer-
cial law and construction law, regularly deal with guaranty or
surety bond transactions. Such practitioners likely will be aware
that a special body of rules governs the rights and obligations of
the parties to such transactions. In commercial lending transac-
tions, guaranties are often required as additional security for re-
payment of a loan. In the construction field, the contractor and
subcontractors are usually, if not always, required to obtain a bond
from a corporate surety company to assure the owner, laborers,
and materialmen of performance by the contractor. Hbwever, prin-
ciples of suretyship can extend well beyond these traditional con-
texts. Even though the surety relationship is contractual in na-
ture,' such relationship need not be created by express agreement.
Although a surety relationship will not be created by mere implica-
tion,2 suretyship "by operation of law" may arise by extension of
"the privileges of suretyship to parties already bound upon some
other contract."'3 It is this type of transaction that will be consid-
ered in this Article.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho, College of Law. Chair, Task Force on
Suretyship, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, Section of Business Law, Ameri-
can Bar Association. The author would like to thank Professor Elizabeth B. Brandt, Univer-
sity of Idaho College of Law, and Mr. Donald J. Rapson for their very helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article.
1. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, Division II, Suretyship, scope note (1941); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1 & cmt. f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992); 1 GEORGE W. BRANDT, THE
LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 1 (3d ed. 1905); LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 18 (1950); ARTHUR A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 1.1
(5th ed. 1951).
2. STEARNS, supra note 1, § 2.2.
3. Id. § 2.3.
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The precise scope of the various rules governing the rights and
obligations of the parties to such suretyship transactions4 is dis-
cussed in greater detail elsewhere in this Symposium. For the pur-
pose of this Article, it suffices to say that the obligation of the sec-
ondary obligor in such transactions, which acts as security for the
underlying obligation, may be lost to the obligee if the obligee en-
gages in certain acts that prejudicially affect the secondary obli-
gor's right of recourse against the principal obligor upon perform-
ance of the secondary obligation.' Accordingly, although the ob-
4. Each transaction giving rise to a suretyship relation involves at least the following
three parties: 1) the party owed performance of the obligation (the creditor/obligee); 2) the
party primarily responsible for performance of the underlying obligation (the principal
debtor/principal obligor); and 3) the party secondarily liable for performance of the underly-
ing obligation (the surety/secondary obligor). See infra part II.
In the Restatement of Security, these parties are referred to respectively as the "credi-
tor," the "principal," and the "surety." RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 cmts. b-d. The pro-
posed Restatement of Suretyship employs new, more neutral terms for the parties in an
attempt to avoid the confusion that has surrounded the older terms, "surety" and "guar-
anty" in particular. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP (Tent. Draft No. 1); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993). The proposed Restatement refers to
the parties as the "obligee," the "principal obligor," and the "secondary obligor." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1 & cmt. d (Tent. Draft No. 1). This Article uses the new
terminology of the Restatement of Suretyship except when discussion of a case requires
reference to the language used by the court.
5. The existence of suretyship status accords the secondary obligor, or more important for
our purposes, one in the position of a secondary obligor, certain rights against the principal
obligor and defenses against the obligee. The basic rights of the secondary obligor include
the right of exoneration, which entitles the secondary obligor, when called upon by the obli-
gee to perform, to require the principal obligor to perform, preventing the secondary obligor
from incurring the cost of performance. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 103, 112; RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 14, 17 (Tent. Draft No. 1). The secondary obligor is also
granted the right to recover from the principal obligor amounts paid to the obligee in satis-
faction of the principal obligation. Such recovery is available by reimbursement and restitu-
tion from the principal obligor. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 104-111; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 18, 22 (Tent. Draft No. 2). Finally, upon performance of the
principal obligation by the secondary obligor, the secondary obligor is entitled to be subro-
gated to the rights of the obligee against the principal obligor. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY
§ 141; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 23-24 (Tent. Draft No. 2).
In addition, the secondary obligor is accorded special defenses against the obligee, gener-
ally resulting from some action of the obligee that prejudices one or more of the secondary
obligor's basic rights. Suretyship defenses such as discharge for release of the principal obli-
gor, extensions of time granted the principal obligor in performing the underlying obliga-
tion, alteration of the terms of the underlying obligation, and impairment of collateral may
result in discharging the secondary obligor-in whole or in part-from its obligation under
the secondary obligation. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 122, 127-129, 132; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 15 (Tent. Draft No. 1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 33
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ligee obtains additional security for the performance of the princi-
pal obligation, its rights in dealing with the principal obligor may
be circumscribed in order for it to retain its full rights against the
secondary obligor.' Because failure to recognize those transactions
that implicate suretyship principles may result in an obligee's los-
ing the security for the principal obligation represented by a sec-
ondary obligor, it is critical for an obligee and its counsel to be able
to recognize such transactions.
Part II of this Article begins by briefly reviewing the standard
framework of the basic suretyship transaction. With this back-
ground, Part III considers transactions in which a third party as-
sumes the underlying obligation and/or receives property from the
original obligor securing the underlying obligation. In such transac-
tions, the courts have granted suretyship status to the original ob-
ligor, thereby imposing on the obligee suretyship obligations to-
ward the original obligor after the transaction. The discussion
elucidates the basis for imposing a surety relationship on the par-
ties and shows why such imposition is justified. Part IV proceeds
further toward the fringe, with examples of cases that have applied
suretyship principles in less obvious situations. Such cases demon-
strate that, upon analysis of the totality of the substantive rights
and obligations of the parties, suretyship principles properly apply
to many transactions, notwithstanding the apparent lack of any
surety relationship among the parties. The Article concludes with a
recommendation concerning how far suretyship principles may or
ought to be applied in situations that otherwise would appear to
bear no relationship to suretyship.
II. THE BASIC TRANSACTION
Both Division II of the Restatement of Security7 and the un-
folding Restatement of Suretyship address the scope of coverage
(Tent. Draft No. 2). See generally STEARNS, supra note 1, §§ 6.1-.55 (discussing discharge
of the surety).
6. A very important exception exists when the obligee has obtained waivers of suretyship
defenses or consent to otherwise proscribed action from the secondary obligor. Such waivers
and consents are broadly validated. See U.C.C. § 3-605 (1990); RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY
§§ 122, 128 & cmt. c, 129 & cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 42 (Tent. Draft
No. 2).
7. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 82-211.
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in the law of suretyship. The basis for the existence of a surety
relationship is the existence of an obligation to an obligee, per-
formance of which is owed by two or more persons, and which, as
between these obligors, should be performed by one rather than
the other." The notion that one obligor rather than the other ought
to perform provides the principal justification for the imposition of
suretyship status, with its unique rights and defenses," in transac-
tions that the parties might not immediately recognize as giving
rise to such status.10
The fundamental structure of the suretyship transaction is trian-
gular: on the corners one finds the creditor/obligee, the principal
debtor/principal obligor, and the surety/secondary obligor." ' The
line running between the obligee and the principal obligor repre-
sents the underlying contract, performance of which is primarily
8. The Restatement of Security provides:
Suretyship is the relation which exists where one person has undertaken an
obligation and another person is also under an obligation or other duty to the
obligee, who is entitled to but one performance, and as between the two who
are bound, one rather than the other person should perform.
Id. § 82.
The Restatement of Suretyship clarifies this definition as follows:
Transactions Giving Rise to Suretyship Status
(1) A "secondary obligor" has suretyship status whenever:
(a) one person (the "principal obligor") owes performance of a duty (the
"underlying obligation") to another person (the "obligee"); and
(b) pursuant to contract, a third person (the "secondary obligor") is subject
to a "secondary obligation," whereby either:
(1) the secondary obligor also owes performance, in whole or in part,
of the duty of the principal obligor to the obligee; or
(2) the obligee has recourse against the secondary obligor or its
property:
(i) in the event of the failure of principal obligor to perform the
underlying obligation; or
(ii) to protect the obligee against loss arising from potential
non-performance by the principal obligor; and
(c) to the extent that the underlying obligation or the secondary obligation is
performed the obligee is not entitled to performante of the other; and
(d) as between the principal obligor and the secondary obligor, the principal
obligor has a duty to perform the underlying obligation or bear the cost of
performance.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1).
9. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 4.
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the responsibility of the principal obligor.12 The lines running be-
tween the obligee and secondary obligor and the secondary obligor
and the principal obligor may be less well defined. Often there is
an express agreement-such as a guaranty or surety bond-
between the obligee and the secondary obligor. 13 There may be an
express agreement between the principal obligor and the secondary
obligor outlining the rights of the secondary obligor against the
principal obligor in the event the secondary obligor is required to
perform; for example, express rights of indemnification and
reimbursement. 14
Situations often arise, however, in which the surety relationships
between the obligee and secondary obligor and the secondary obli-
gor and the principal obligor exist not by express agreement, but
by operation of law based on the contractual relations of the par-
ties.15 Even when an express agreement exists between the obligee
and the secondary obligor, often the secondary obligor and princi-
pal obligor will have no such agreement. In such cases, if the sec-
ondary obligor is called upon to perform the underlying obligation,
the rights of the secondary obligor against the principal obligor re-
sult from implied contract or equitable principles of restitution
and subrogation.10 More important, the obligee may obtain en-
forcement rights against a third party by virtue of a transfer or
assignment of property by the original obligor. The obligee may
obtain such enforcement rights as a third party beneficiary of the
agreement between the original obligor and the third party,17 or, in
12. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 cmt. c.
13. See id. § 83(a) & cmt. b; SIMPSON, supra note 1, § 18.
14. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 96 & cmt. b. Such an express agreement may be
critical when the secondary obligor seeks to recover costs of defending an action by the
obligee. In Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Harper, 94 P.2d 586 (Cal. 1939), the California Supreme
Court refused to allow the surety to recover costs of successfully defending an action by the
obligee, in the absence of an agreement between the principal obligor and the secondary
obligor providing for indemnification of such expenses. Id. at 589.
15. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
16. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 104 & cmt. f; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§§ 18 & cmt. a, 22 & cmt. a (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993); SIMPSON, supra note 1, § 48 (discuss-
ing surety's right of reimbursement); see also STEARNS, supra note 1, §§ 11.1-.17 (discussing
subrogation).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302-314 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY
§ 83 & cmt. e; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 2(d)-(e) & cmts. d-e (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1992).
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the context of leases, because the third party comes into privity of
estate with the obligee by assignment of the original obligor's in-
terest under the lease.18 In such cases, the obligee obtains a second
obligor for performance of the underlying obligation. As between
the original obligor and the third party, however, the latter ought
to perform the underlying obligation because it has received the
benefits of the underlying transaction and/or has agreed with the
original obligor to perform the underlying transaction. 9 It is in
these cases, in which the secondary obligor's rights and obligations
arise from changed circumstances by operation of law, that recog-
nition of the resulting surety relationship becomes more difficult.
Both the Restatement of Security and the Restatement of Sure-
tyship provide that the surety relationship arises when a third'
party assumes the obligation of the principal obligor without nova-
tion.20 In such a case, the third party, by virtue of the assumption,
becomes a principal obligor, and the original obligor becomes a sec-
ondary obligor with suretyship status.2'
Such transactions comport with the basic definition of surety-
ship as a relationship wherein two or more obligors owe perform-
ance to the obligee and as between the two obligors, one rather
than the other ought to perform or bear the cost of performance.22
In the usual mortgage assumption transaction, the mortgagor con-
veys the encumbered property to a third party who agrees to pay
the debt secured by the property. The mortgagor has received con-
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 16.1 (1977).
19. See STEARNS, supra note 1, § 1.4.
20. The Restatement of Security provides: "The suretyship relation is created where the
surety . . . having been a principal obligor, his obligation, without a novation, has been
assumed by another or his property has been transferred under such circumstances as to
place the property under the primary burden of the obligation." RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY
§ 83(c).
The Restatement of Suretyship provides:
The secondary obligor may become subject to the secondary obligation:
(e) by contract between an obligor and another person pursuant to which,
without a novation, the other person assumes a duty of the obligor to the obli-
gee, with the result that the other person becomes the principal obligor and the
original obligor becomes the secondary obligor.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 2(e) (Tent. Draft No. 1).
21. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 83(c); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 2(e) (Tent.
Draft No. 1).
22. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82; supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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sideration presumably equivalent to its equity in the property. The
transferee has purchased this equity and obtained the use and ben-
efit of the property. It is only proper that, as the new owner of the
property and all its benefits, the transferee should satisfy the debt
secured by the property. The understanding, if not the express
agreement, between transferor and transferee is that the transferee
will perform the underlying obligation because it is the party re-
ceiving the benefits of ownership of the property. Similarly, when a
lessee assigns a lease and the assignee agrees to perform the obliga-
tions under the prime lease, the assignee, as the new beneficiary of
the prime lease, is the proper party to perform the obligations
under the prime lease.
Although the relations between assignor and assignee in the
foregoing situations may seem self-evident, the propriety of apply-
ing suretyship principles to these transactions may not be so ap-
parent. After all, there is a third party-the obligee-who has a
significant interest in these transactions. As between the assignor
and assignee, it is certainly plausible, as an original proposition,
that the law should leave them to their contract concerning their
rights and obligations between themselves. Indeed, the right of re-
imbursement afforded the assignor as a secondary obligor is dupli-
cative of the right of the assignor to enforce the express or implied
agreement of the assignee to perform the terms of the underlying
contract as part of the consideration for the assignment. Of greater
significance to the assignor is the possible application of suretyship
principles in restricting the rights of the obligee in its dealings with
the assignee. If the assignor is imbued with suretyship status, then,
under appropriate circumstances, it may have rights and defenses
against the obligee that otherwise would be unavailable without
the express agreement of the obligee. 3
Of critical importance to the obligee is the requirement that
before the obligee is bound to recognize the suretyship status of
the assignor/original obligor, -the obligee must have notice of the
new arrangement. 24 Until the obligee receives notice, it is not
23. See, e.g., infra notes 47-71 and accompanying text (discussing impairment of collat-
eral); infra note 89 (reproducing § 33 of the Restatement of Suretyship, setting out surety-
ship defenses).
24. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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bound to recognize the new suretyship status of the original obli-
gor.25 Notice of the new situation allows the obligee to adjust its
dealings with the parties to protect its interests. Yet even granting
the propriety of such a notice requirement, the question remains
whether the obligee should be bound by a unilateral act of the
original obligor imposing duties not originally contemplated by the
obligee.
Even though the rules of suretyship are legal rules with their
basis in contract, courts and commentators have consistently rec-
ognized the equitable nature of many of the secondary obligor's
rights and defenses. 26 This recognition of the equitable aspect of
the secondary obligor's rights requires careful scrutiny of the cir-
cumstances in which suretyship status may be conferred on a party
by operation of law-that is, without the express consent and
agreement of all the parties-so as to ensure against injustice to
any of the parties. In formulating broad rules, drafters of the Re-
statement of Suretyship not only must deal with existing author-
ity, but also must address the underlying equity and justice of the
rules adopted. Such consideration necessarily entails making as-
sumptions about the way in which the original transactions are
structured at their inception, and about how and under what cir-
cumstances assignment transactions occur. Because application of
suretyship by operation of law amounts to an involuntary imposi-
tion of rights and defenses available to the original obligor against
the obligee, consideration must be directed to what the obligee
may have done if confronted with such a situation at the inception
of the relationship with the original obligor, and how that response
should be weighed against the propriety of granting these aug-
mented rights to the original obligor.
25. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 114 (1941); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§ 28(2)-(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
26. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Bethlehem Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 314, 316-17 (1941)
(discussing the equitable nature of the right of subrogation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURE-
TYSHIP §§ 18 cmt. a, 22 cmt. a (Tent. Draft No. 2) (distinguishing the secondary obligor's
right of reimbursement, founded on implied contract, and right of restitution, founded on
restitution and unjust enrichment principles); EDWARD W. SPENCER, THE GENERAL LAW OF
SURETYSHIP §§ 117, 133, 149, 176 (1913) (noting the equitable origins for the secondary obli-
gor's rights of reimbursement, subrogation, contribution, and exoneration, respectively);
STEARNS, supra note 1, §§ 11.1-.47 (discussing equitable rights of the surety).
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III. ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION CASES
A. Debt and Mortgage Assumptions
The assumption of an obligation by a third party, without a no-
vation, creates a surety relationship among the original obligor, the
assuming party, and the obligee.2 7 Similarly, when an obligor/mort-
gagor conveys property encumbered by a mortgage to one who ex-
pressly assumes the obligation secured by the mortgage, the major-
ity of courts have recognized that the obligee/mortgagee is bound
to respect the newly acquired suretyship status of the original obli-
gor/mortgagor..2  This position is consistent with the rules outlined
in both the Restatement of Security and the Restatement of Sure-
tyship.2" Furthermore, it does not prejudice the obligee, inasmuch
as the obligee is bound by the original obligor's new suretyship sta-
tus only from the time the obligee receives notice of the new ar-
rangement.30 As one commentator has noted, "If the arrangement
27. See supra note 20; see also Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Wolfer, 88 Cal. 'Rptr. 654,
657 (Ct. App. 1970) (holding that an assumption of debt in connection with the purchase of
a business created a surety relationship among the original obligor, assuming party, and
obligee); Twombley v. Wulf, 482 P.2d 166, 168 (Or. 1971) (same); Horman v. Gordon, 740
P.2d 1346, 1353 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (holding that an assumption of debt in connection
with the purchase of a shopping center created a surety relationship); cf. In re Paul R. Dean
Co., 460 F. Supp. 452, 456-57 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that no suretyship was created when
a party held retained securities as an agent and did not assume debt); Mercantile Holdings,
Inc. v. Keeshin, 543 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (ruling that an assumption of
debt in connection with an assigned interest in land trust created a surety relationship).
28. See Moss v. McDonald, 772 P.2d 626, 627 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Ruther v. Thomas,
604 P.2d 703, 705 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); Prigal v. Kearn, 557 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Alford, 238 N.W. 646, 648 (N.D. 1931); Sooner Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Oklahoma Cent. Credit Union, 790 P.2d 526, 530 (Okla. 1989); Thomp-
son v. Miller, 79 S.E.2d 643, 646 (Va. 1954); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States
Trust Co., 50 P.2d 904, 907 (Wash. 1935); Weickhardt v. Wauwatosa Say. & Loan Ass'n, 309
N.W.2d 865, 868 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981). But see Yasuna v. Miller, 399 A.2d 68, 74 (D.C. 1979)
(requiring a showing of mutual agreement among the obligee, the original mortgagor, and
the assuming party for the mortgagor to obtain surety status by virtue of the assumption
transaction); Shockey v. Page, 354 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (holding that upon
assumption of mortgage indebtedness, original obligors do not become mere sureties in the
absence of an acceptance by the obligee of the assuming grantee as the principal obligor or a
release of original obligors from further liability).
29. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 83 cmt. e; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 2
cmt. e, illus. 3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 28 (Tent.
Draft No. 2).
30. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 114; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 28(2)-(3)
(Tent. Draft No. 2); see infra note 49.
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is unknown to the creditor, he is in no way affected by it. However,
if he knows that one party has acquired the status of a mere
surety, he must recognize the equities of a surety in dealing with
such party in all subsequent transactions." 31 Thus, even though
the original obligor/mortgagor may not unilaterally avoid liability
to its obligee, the mortgagor can alter its status with respect to its
liability on the underlying obligation by entering into a sale-and-
assumption transaction and giving notice of this transaction to the
obligee. However, before the original obligor/mortgagor will obtain
any benefit from its newly acquired suretyship status, the obligee
must take some action with respect to the assuming party/trans-
feree that gives rise to a suretyship defense available to the origi-
nal obligor.32 If the obligee does nothing to affect the rights of the
secondary obligor/mortgagor, it retains full right to recover from
either the transferor/mortgagor or transferee/assuming party.
In Horman v. Gordon,33 the Utah Court of Appeals analyzed the
relationship of parties following the sale of a shopping center.34
Gordon was indebted to Horman under three separate notes aggre-
gating $41,500.31 In connection with his purchase of a shopping
center from a corporation of which Gordon was a principal share-
holder, Kingston assumed the indebtedness owed to Horman.36
Subsequent to this transaction, Horman released Kingston from li-
ability on the assumed indebtedness. 3 7 The court determined that
Horman was aware of the assumption of the debt by Kingston and
that no novation had occurred relative to Horman's rights against
Gordon. The court held that even though Horman had not agreed
to the assumption, his release of Kingston, the assuming obligor,
operated to release Gordon as Kingston's surety.39 Relying heavily
on the Restatement of Security, the court held that Kingston be-
31. STEARNS, supra note 1, § 2.3.
32. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 122, 127-129, 132; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURE-
TYSHIP § 15 (Tent. Draft No. 1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 33 (Tent. Draft No.
2); infra note 89.
33. 740 P.2d 1346 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
34. Id. at 1348-49.
35. Id. at 1349.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1353.
39. Id. at 1353-54.
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came the principal obligor by virtue of his assumption of the in-
debtedness of Gordon.40 Accordingly, the release of Kingston, the
principal obligor, by Horman, the obligee, operated as a discharge
of Gordon, the secondary obligor.
Similarly, in Prigal v. Kearn,'" the obligee sold property to the
obligor and took back a purchase-money mortgage to secure the
sale price.42 After the sale, the original mortgagor sold the property
to a party who assumed the obligation secured by the mortgage,
and as a result of such assumption of personal liability by the
transferee, the original mortgagor "acquired the status of a
surety.'43 Upon default by the assuming transferee, the mortgagee
accepted from the assuming transferee a deed in lieu of foreclosure
and resold the land to an unrelated third party.44 The court held
that under Florida law, the receipt of the deed in lieu of foreclo-
sure terminated any rights the mortgagee had held under the
mortgage and resulted "in a discharge of the mortgage and a satis-
faction of the debt. '45 Consequently, the court affirmed the dis-
charge of the original mortgagor on the alternative grounds of dis-
charge of the underlying obligation and impairment of collateral
security for the obligation, noting that "[u]nder the facts sub
judice, it would be manifestly unjust to allow the original lender to
reacquire fee simple title to the land and also recover the full
amount of the purchase money mortgage note given to him upoA
the occasion of the initial sale."'46
The result in Prigal is consistent with the current version of the
Restatement of Suretyship47 because the prejudice to the second-
ary obligor in that case resulted from the obligee's affirmatively
accepting the deed in lieu of foreclosure and reselling the property,
thereby discharging the underlying debt and impairing the original
obligor's recourse to the property. However, when an impairment-
of-collateral defense arises by virtue of the obligee's failure to act,
40. Id. at 1352.
41. 557 So. 2d 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
42. Id. at 647-48.
43. Id. at 648.
44. Id. at 647.
45. Id. at 648.
46. Id. at 649.
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 28, 38 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
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the current draft of the Restatement provides a significant qualifi-
cation. In such a case, the secondary obligor's defense based on
impairment of collateral 48 arises only after the obligee has mani-
fested assent to the obligor/transferor's change of status.49
This qualification serves to preserve the fundamental purpose of
suretyship, which is to provide "additional assurance to the one
entitled to the performance of an act that the act will be per-
48. Section 38 of the Restatement of Suretyship provides:
(1) If the underlying obligation is secured by an interest in collateral and
the obligee impairs the value of that interest, the secondary obligation is dis-
charged to the extent that such impairment would otherwise increase the dif-
ference between the maximum amount recoverable by the secondary obligor
pursuant to its subrogation rights (§§ 23-27) and the value of the collateral.
(2) Impairing the value of an interest in collateral includes:
(a) failure to obtain or maintain perfection or recordation of the
interest in collateral;
(b) release of collateral without substitution of collateral of equal
value or equivalent reduction of the underlying obligation;
(c) failure to perform a duty to preserve the value of collateral owed
to the principal obligor or the secondary obligor; and
(d) failure to comply with applicable law in disposing of collateral.
Id. §38.
49. Section 28 of the Restatement of Suretyship provides:
(1) The duties of the secondary obligor to the obligee are determined by
the contract creating the secondary obligation, subject to defenses resulting
from the incidents of suretyship status (§ 33-43). The duties of the obligee to
the secondary obligor are determined by the contract creating the secondary
obligation and by the incidents of suretyship status (Q 33).
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), when a person whom the obligee
reasonably believes to be a principal obligor is a secondary obligor, the obligee
is not affected by the incidents of the secondary obligor's suretyship status
until the obligee has notice that the person is a secondary obligor.
(3) To the extent that a person originally obligated to an obligee as a prin-
cipal obligor becomes a secondary obligor with respect to that obligation:
(a) the obligee is not affected by the incidents of such obligor's sure-
tyship status until the obligee has knowledge that the original obligor
has become a secondary obligor; and
(b) if (i) the original obligor furnishes collateral for its obligation
before that obligor becomes a secondary obligor, and (ii) the original
obligor's interest in that collateral is transferred to a person who be-
comes a principal obligor, then, until the obligee manifests assent to the
original obligor's change of status, the obligee's failure to take any act
does not discharge the secondary obligation pursuant to § 38 (impair-
ment of collateral) except to the extent that such failure would have
discharged the original obligor if the original obligor had remained a
principal obligor.
Id. § 28.
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formed. '5 0 Although suretyship principles accord the secondary
obligor unique defenses against enforcement of the secondary obli-
gation by the obligee,51 such defenses are premised on the occur-
rence of some action by the obligee that prejudicially affects the
secondary obligor. In a sense, actions taken by the obligee to the
detriment of the secondary obligor estop the obligee from asserting
all or part of its claim against the secondary obligor.52 In the ab-
sence of such actions, the obligee has full recourse against both the
principal obligor and the secondary obligor. 3
When the surety relationship arises by virtue of the assumption
of the original obligor's obligation, notice of the new arrangement
allows the obligee to avoid taking action that would prejudice the
original obligor's recourse against the assuming party.54 Although
the obligee's ability to deal solely with the principal obligor/assum-
ing party has been circumscribed, the obligee has obtained two ob-
ligors for performance of the obligation.5 5 If the obligee wishes to
continue to rely solely on the original obligor, it may continue to
deal with the original obligor without risk of discharging that
party.5 Only whdn the obligee begins dealing with the new princi-
pal obligor-for example, by extending the date for performance or
otherwise altering the underlying contract-does it risk discharg-
ing the original obligor from further liability.
The Restatement of Suretyship's qualification to the general
rule binding the obligee to the new suretyship status of the original
obligor upon receipt of notice does not affect this dynamic.57 The
absence of the obligee's manifested assent to the new situation
only precludes the transferor/secondary obligor from asserting dis-
charges based on impairment of collateral resulting from the obli-
gee's failure to act.5 s From the time the obligee receives notice of
50. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, Division II, Suretyship, scope note (1941).
51. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 5.
53. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 & cmt. f; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1 &
cmt. b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 33 & cmts. a-b
(Tent. Draft No. 2).
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 28 cmts. a-b (Tent. Draft No. 2).
55. See id. cmt. c.
56. Id.
57. See id. § 28.
58. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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the new situation, the transferor/secondary obligor retains the
right to discharges based on the obligee's affirmative acts, such as
releases of collateral, that impair the value of the collateral. 9
By considering the position of the obligee who takes collateral to
secure the original obligation, the distinction between preserving
discharges based on obligee actions taken with respect to the col-
lateral and precluding discharges based on the obligee's inaction
can be justified. When, as part of the original transaction, the obli-
gee relies on the collateral as additional security for performance
of the underlying obligation, the obligee can be expected to protect
and preserve the collateral regardless of any change in the status of
its original obligor. The pursuit of its own interest in preserving
the collateral minimizes the likelihood that the obligee will take
actions that would prejudice the rights of the secondary obligor.
However, the obligee may decide to extend credit principally on
the creditworthiness of the obligor, and not in reliance on the col-
lateral. In such a case, in which the obligee takes the collateral
merely as an addition to the general creditworthiness of the origi-
nal obligor, the obligee "may not . . . intend[] to protect aggres-
sively its rights with respect to the collateral."60 In most circum-
stances, failure to preserve collateral would not serve to discharge
the original obligor as the principal obligor. As a result, "the origi-
nal obligor, by engaging in the sale and assumption transaction,
would impose [costs of preserving the collateral] on the obligee
that the obligee would not otherwise have any obligation to
bear."'" The original obligor, by its unilateral act of entering into
the sale-and-assumption transaction, should not have the ability to
impose such costs on the obligee.
By requiring the obligee's assent to the changed status of the
original obligor before allowing the original obligor to assert dis-
charges based on impairment of collateral flowing from the obli-
gee's inaction, the Restatement preserves the obligee's right to deal
with the collateral in the manner originally contemplated at the
time it extended credit to the original obligor 6 2 Because the obli-
59. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text; infra notes 61-62 and accompanying
text.
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 28 cmt. d (Tent. Draft No. 2).
61. Id.
62. See id.
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gee's assent may be "demonstrated by [the obligee's] dealing with
the new principal obligor as a principal obligor,"6 the Restatement
preserves the right of the assignor/secondary obligor to claim dis-
charges flowing from actions of the obligee that prejudice its
rights.6 4 The balance thus struck between the rights of the trans-
feror/secondary obligor and the obligee assures that the obligee
will receive the benefits of the new surety relationship (i.e., acquir-
ing an additional obligor) while retaining the proper defenses of
the secondary obligor that result from the actions of the obligee.
B. The "Subject to" Cases
When an obligor transfers property that serves as collateral for
the obligation to a third .party who takes subject to the encum-
brance, but who does not personally assume the obligation, the ap-
plication of suretyship principles becomes even more complicated.
One may contend that the transferor in a "subject to" sale is in a
position similar to a guarantor of a nonrecourse debt. 5 In such a
case, the guarantor is the only person against whom the obligee
may proceed in personam to collect the debt.66 The party that has
incurred the principal obligation has contractually limited any re-
63. Id.; see also Prudential Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Nadler, 345 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1976) ("[A] mortgagee, by its dealings with the grantee and mortgagor, may recognize
the former as the principal debtor and the latter as a surety towards itself."); Hazifotis v.
Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 505 N.E.2d 445, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (finding no evi-
dence of dealings between the mortgagee and assuming grantee to justify recognition of
suretyship status of the original mortgagor).
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 28 cmt. d (Tent. Draft No. 2).
65. See comment f to section 2 of the Restatement, which states:
Sometimes a person who owns property subject to a security interest or
mortgage transfers the property to a buyer who agrees to take the property
subject to the security interest or mortgage but does not assume the debt se-
cured by the property. In such cases, it is usually an explicit or implicit term of
the transaction that the buyer will either pay the debt (thereby obtaining clear
title to the property) or suffer foreclosure of the property, but that the seller
will not be called upon to pay the debt. The result is that the seller, who is still
obligated to the creditor, becomes a secondary obligor and the buyer becomes a
principal obligor whose obligation is limited to the property. Thus the seller/
secondary obligor is in a position similar to that of guarantor of a non-recourse
loan; i.e., one that is secured by collateral but for which the principal obligor is
not personally responsible.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 2 cmt. f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
66. See id.
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course against itself to the collateral. The Restatement of Surety-
ship, consistent with this transaction and with the apparent under-
standing of all the parties, limits the guarantor's recourse for
reimbursement to the collateral in order to protect the expecta-
tions of the principal obligor.6
In the same manner, when a seller of property encumbered by a
mortgage transfers the property to a buyer who takes subject to
the encumbrance but does not assume the obligation secured, the
transferee is in the position of a "principal obligor" who has lim-
ited the obligee's recourse for collection of the debt to an in rem
action against the property."8 To allow the seller the benefits of
suretyship status is no different in this case than in the case in
which the guarantor has agreed to be personally liable on a nonre-
course debt. Or is it?
In the guaranteed, nonrecourse debt scenario, the parties are
aware of the situation at the time they enter into the deal. The
obligee expects to have recourse against the land and against the
guarantor. The obligee also understands that the guarantor may
67. The Restatement of Suretyship provides: "If satisfaction of the principal obligor's
duty to the obligee pursuant to the underlying obligation is limited to a particular fund or
property, satisfaction of the duty of reimbursement is limited to the same fund or prop-
erty." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 19(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2).
In meetings with the Reporter for the Restatement, members of the American Bar Associ-
ation's Task Force on Suretyship (part of the U.C.C. Committee of the ABA's Business Law
Section) expressed their disagreement with this position. These members would allow the
secondary obligor to have full recourse against the nonrecourse principal obligor on the
ground that it is inequitable to allow the principal obligor to impose a greater obligation on
the secondary obligor than it was willing to undertake itself. The response to this position
focuses on the fact that all parties are aware of the liabilities assumed, and so it is not
inequitable to allow the principal obligor to limit to the property its liability (to either the
obligee or the secondary obligors).
In the end, the position must be determined in light of what the parties to such transac-
tions actually understand to be the case. Do guarantors of such obligations understand that
their recourse against the principal obligor will be limited to the property, and do principal
obligors believe that their liability to the secondary obligors will be so limited? Given the
ability to contract around the rules of the Restatement, the proper resolution of this issue
should turn on the determination of which party, the principal obligor or the secondary
obligor, is in the best position to protect its interest by appropriate contractual provisions.
In the end, it may not be possible to answer this question because the parties to such trans-
actions-on all sides-are generally sophisticated business people.
68. The Restatement of Suretyship actually states that "the buyer becomes a principal
obligor whose obligation is limited to the property." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§ 2 cmt. f (Tent. Draft No. 1) (emphasis added); see supra note 65.
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have certain suretyship defenses and rights flowing from its posi-
tion as a surety. Accordingly, to give itself the greatest flexibility,
the obligee is in a position to obtain from the guarantor appropri-
ate waivers and consents to any action it may take in the future.6 9
When the obligee begins with a recourse, secured obligation in-
volving but one party, the principal obligor, its expectations are
different. It generally may expect a free hand in dealing with the
collateral, knowing that it has recourse personally against the prin-
cipal obligor. Upon a sale to a "subject to" transferee, the credi-
tor's position changes. At this point, if the original obligor is ac-
corded suretyship status to the extent of the value of the collateral,
the obligee's former ability to deal with the collateral is impaired.
As in the case of mortgage assignments with assumption of debt,7 0
the Restatement of Suretyship properly provides that discharges
of the original obligor based on impairment of collateral resulting
from the obligee's failure to act are available only upon assent by
the mortgagee to treat the transferee (or the land) as the principal
obligor."
The question becomes whether the other suretyship defenses
pose similar problems in the context of the "subject to" transfer.
Professor George Stevens analyzed cases affording the obligor/
transferor relief when the obligee extended the time for perform-
ance of the obligation by the "subject to" transferee. 72 As Stevens
aptly notes, in "subject to" transfers, no second person is liable for
the obligation and, accordingly, the transferor cannot be said to be
liable for the payment of a debt that ought to be paid by another.73
He further points out that in order to afford the surety a defense,
the extension must be given to the principal obligor. 4 Certainly, in
69. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
70. See supra part III.A.
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 28(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2); supra note 49.
In the context of the "subject to" transfer, this limitation on the availability of the defense
of impairment of collateral (resulting from failures to take action by the obligee) is particu-
larly important. If the transferor/obligor were to be discharged because the obligee failed to
act to preserve collateral, the obligee could be faced with the loss of both the collateral and
the only party personally liable for the obligation.
72. See George N. Stevens, Extension Agreements in the "Subject-To" Mortgage Situa-
tion, 15 U. CIN. L. REV. 58 (1941).
73. See id. at 71.
74. Id. at 72.
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this context the "subject to" transferee is not a principal obligor
because, as just noted, it has no liability at all on the underlying
transaction. Professor Stevens forcefully argues that the technical
rules of suretyship should not be imported into this area of mort-
gage law.75
Regardless of any technical merit these arguments may have,"6
the inquiry in these transactions must focus on the prejudice actu-
ally resulting to the obligee in its ability to deal with the debt and
the collateral. Again, when the original transaction is the guaranty
of a nonrecourse obligation, the creditor is in the position to obtain
all necessary waivers and consents from the guarantor as part of
the original deal.77 Because most obligees in these transactions are
not in the business of foreclosing on collateral, but rather in the
business of lending money for interest, most obligees likely will
prefer to work out a default situation rather than foreclose or enter
into litigation. In the guaranteed, nonrecourse debt transaction,
the obligee retains such freedom to work out defaults with the
nonrecourse principal obligor because of its ability to obtain neces-
sary waivers and consents from the guarantors as part of the origi-
nal transaction. 78 By comparing the position of the obligee follow-
ing a "subject to" transfer in dealing with a default scenario, the
dissimilarity between these two transactions becomes apparent.
Except with respect to defenses based on impairment of collat-
eral, the current position of the Restatement is that the creditor is
bound to recognize the suretyship status of the original debtor
once the creditor has notice of the new situation.79 Yet from the
obligee's standpoint, the party in the better position-and argua-
bly with the greater incentive-to pay the obligation is the current
owner, the "subject to" transferee. Though not personally liable on
75. Id. at 72-73.
76. The approach of the Restatement of Suretyship avoids these technical arguments by
equating the "subject to" transferee with the principal obligor under a nonrecourse obliga-
tion whose liability is limited to the property. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 2
cmt. f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992); supra notes 65, 68.
77. See supra note 6.
78. See supra notes 6, 69 and accompanying text.
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 28 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993). Even when the
defense is based on impairment of collateral, the obligee is bound from the time it receives
notice as to actions taken which impair collateral. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying
text.
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the obligation, the transferee is the party using the property and
exposed to loss of any equity in the property. The original obligor
may well have moved from the locale where the property is located
and may take the view that the transferee can be expected to act
in its own self-interest to preserve the collateral by satisfying the
secured obligation. One might reasonably assume that, in the event
of trouble relating to the transferee's continued performance of the
underlying obligation, the obligee will work with the transferee-as
it likely would work with the nonrecourse principal obligor-to at-
tempt to work out a solution rather than attempt to work with an
absentee obligor. To preserve its rights against the original obligor,
however, the obligee must obtain consent to any accommodation
offered to the transferee.80 Unlike in the case of an original guar-
anty of a nonrecourse loan, the obligee has not been able to obtain
"up front" waivers and consents from the secondary obligor to deal
with the nonrecourse obligor/owner in any reasonable manner. It
therefore appears that the obligee's freedom of action is limited
under a "subject to" transfer in a way that it is not when the origi-
nal transaction is a nonrecourse, guaranteed obligation. This limi-
tation on the obligee's freedom of action following a "subject to"
transfer may be more apparent than real, at least in the case of the
sophisticated or well-counseled obligee.
The obligee may be in a position to obtain consents and waivers
from the original obligor as part of the original mortgage transac-
tion. For example, in First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Arena,81 the original mortgagor, prior to the "subject to" transfer,
executed an agreement with the obligee which provided:
"That in the event the ownership of said property or any part
thereof becomes vested in a person other than Mortgagor, the
Mortgagee may, without notice to the Mortgagor, deal with such
successor or successors in interest with reference to this mort-
gage and the debt hereby secured in the same manner as with
the Mortgagor, and may forbear to sue or may extend time for
payment of the debt, secured hereby, without discharging or in
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 42 & cmt. a (Tent. Draft No. 2).
81. 406 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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any way affecting the liability of the Mortgagor hereunder or
upon the debt hereby secured."82
Immediately following the "subject to" transfer, the mortgagee
agreed with the transferee to extend the payment of the debt in
return for an express assumption by the transferee and an increase
in the rate of interest payable on the debt.' The court held that
the mortgagee's extension of time to the transferee did not release
the original mortgagor from liability, because the mortgagor had
consented to such extensions in the original agreement between
the mortgagor and the mortgagee.8 " The court held, however, that
the agreement did not permit the mortgagee to increase the inter-
est payable on the underlying debt, notwithstanding the provision
in the mortgage permitting the mortgagee to " 'deal with such suc-
cessor or successors in interest with reference to this mortgage and
the debt hereby secured in the same manner as with the Mortga-
gor.' "8 As a result, the mortgagor was released from all liability to
the mortgagee.8 6
Given the ability of parties to contract around the rules of the
Restatement,87 the effective import of the rules set forth in the
Restatement lies in their function as default rules when the parties
have not agreed otherwise. Sophisticated and well-counseled lend-
ers may be expected to draft their agreements, whether general
mortgage documents or guaranty agreements used in nonrecourse
obligations, with the appropriate waivers and consents necessary to
avoid the potential for unintentionally discharging the liability of a
party. Accordingly, the rules imposing suretyship obligations on
the obligee following a "subject to" transfer become particularly
significant when the parties are unsophisticated.
Given the broad validation of waivers and consents, the imposi-
tion of suretyship obligations on a sophisticated obligee following a
"subject to" transfer of property may not appear to result in any
82. Id. at 1283 (quoting Mortgage Agreement).
83. Id. at 1281-82.
84. Id. at 1285.
85. Id. (quoting Mortgage Agreement); see supra text accompanying note 82.
86. First Federal, 406 N.E.2d at 1284-85. The lesson for counsel in such cases is to draft
such waivers and consents with the greatest specificity possible.
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 13 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 31, 42 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
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greater burden than an imposition in the original guaranty of a
nonrecourse debt. The problem is that few, if any, unsophisticated
parties deal with nonrecourse obligations. However, it is quite real-
istic to believe that a seller of property who takes back a mortgage
to secure the purchase price may be faced with a subsequent trans-
fer by the mortgagor to a "subject to" transferee. In such a case,
the mortgagee likely will not have protected itself with appropriate
waivers and consents, and it therefore runs the real risk that if it
deals with the transferee to work out some subsequent default, it
may inadvertently discharge-in whole or in part-the party it
(wrongly) considers to be the principal obligor."
As a matter of policy, it may be appropriate to impose on sophis-
ticated parties the obligation of protecting their interests through
appropriate waivers and consents; the same cannot be said, how-
ever, for the unsophisticated party unwittingly undone by some
technical rule of suretyship. Fortunately, it is unnecessary to for-
mulate rules in this context based, in some way, on the sophistica-
tion of the parties, considering the rules in the Restatement of
Suretyship relating to the extent of discharge"' and the burden of
88. Of course, any such discharge is only to the extent of the loss caused by the actions of
the obligee. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 33 (Tent. Draft No. 2).
89. Section 33 of the Restatement of Suretyship provides:
(1) The duty of the secondary obligor to perform the secondary obligation
is subject to the condition that the obligee refrain from impairing the recourse
of the secondary obligor against the principal obligor.
(2) Acts that impair the recourse of the secondary obligor against the prin-
cipal obligor include:
(a) release of the principal obligor with respect to the underlying
obligation, as further described in § 35;
(b) extension of time granted to the principal obligor to perform the
underlying obligation, as further described in § 36;
(c) other modification of the underlying obligation, as further de-
scribed in § 37;
(d) impairment of collateral, as further described in § 38; and
(e) any other act that impairs the principal obligor's duty of per-
formance (§ 17), the principal obligor's duty to reimburse (§§ 18-21), or
the secondary obligor's right of restitution (§ 22) or subrogation (§§ 23-
27), as further described in § 39.
(3) If the obligee impairs the recourse of the secondary obligor against the
principal obligor, the secondary obligor is discharged from any unperformed
portion of the secondary obligation to the extent set forth in §§ 35-39.
(4) If the obligee impairs the recourse of the secondary obligor against the
principal obligor
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persuasion in establishing the same.90 The Restatement limits the
discharge afforded the secondary obligor to the extent of loss occa-
(a) after the secondary obligor performs any portion of the second-
ary obligation; or
(b) before the secondary obligor performs a portion of the second-
ary obligation, if the secondary obligor performs:
(i) without knowledge of such act;
(ii) for the benefit of an intended beneficiary who can enforce
the secondary obligation notwithstanding the impairment of re-
course; or
(iii) under business compulsion; then, the secondary obligor
has a claim against the obligee with respect to any portion of the
secondary obligation that has been performed to the extent that
such impairment would have discharged the secondary obligor
with respect to that performance.
Id.
90. The Restatement of Suretyship provides:
Burden of Persuasion
(1) A secondary obligor claiming discharge from a secondary obligation
due to the obligee's impairment of recourse (§ 33) has the burden of persua-
sion with respect to the occurrence of the act constituting the impairment of
recourse.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), the burden of persuasion with
respect to loss or impairment caused by the act impairing recourse is allocated
as follows:
(a) the burden of persuasion is on the secondary obligor if:
(i) the secondary obligor is in the business of entering into
secondary obligations, received a business benefit for entering
into the secondary obligation, or otherwise was induced to enter
into the secondary obligation by separate consideration that di-
rectly benefits the secondary obligor; or
(ii) the act impairing recourse is a modification of the under-
lying obligation and the modification is not material;
(b) otherwise, it is presumed that the act impairing recourse caused
a loss or impairment equal to the secondary obligor's liability pursuant
to the secondary obligation and the burden of persuasion as to the non-
existence or lesser amount of such loss is on the obligee.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)(a), if:
(a) the secondary obligor demonstrates prejudice caused by the im-
pairment of recourse and
(b) the circumstances of the case indicate that the amount of loss is
not reasonably susceptible of calculation or requires proof of facts that
are not ascertainable,
it is presumed that the act impairing recourse caused a loss or impair-
ment equal to the secondary obligor's liability pursuant to the secondary
obligation and the burden of persuasion as to the lesser amount of such
loss is on the obligee.
Id. § 43.
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sioned by the actions of the obligee. 91 With respect to proof of this
loss, the Restatement distinguishes between the so-called "gratui-
tous" surety and "compensated" surety.92 In the former case, the
loss is presumed to equal the amount of the secondary obligation,
unless the obligee proves a lesser loss. 93 In the latter case, the Re-
statement places the burden on the secondary obligor to prove the
extent of its loss. 94 Because the transferor of property in a "subject
to" transfer has received direct consideration for entering into the
secondary obligation in the form of the price paid for its equity in
the property, the transferor will have the burden of establishing
the extent of the loss caused by the obligee's actions. By limiting
the discharge afforded the secondary obligor to the extent of loss
actually suffered, and by allocating to the secondary obligor the
burden of persuasion as to the existence and extent of the loss suf-
fered by the secondary obligor, the Restatement avoids, as much
as possible, many of the problems that arise when unsophisticated
parties are involved in transfers of property subject to existing
encumbrances.
In the context of the "subject to" transfer and the applicability
of suretyship status and rights, the Restatement provides default
rules that achieve an appropriate balance between the equities of
unsophisticated parties, as to both obligees and original obligors. 95
At the same time, sophisticated parties retain the power to protect
their respective interests by contract and may be expected to do
SO.
9 6
C. Lease Assignments
In the context of lease assignments and assumptions, the courts
are split on the question of the suretyship status of the original
obligor/assignor vis-A-vis the obligee.9 7 One view holds that the as-
91. See supra note 89.
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 43 cmt. b (Tent. Draft No. 2).
93. Id. § 43(2)(b); see supra note 90.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 43(2)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2); see supra note
90.
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 33 (Tent. Draft No. 2).
96. See id. § 42.
97. See 3A GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES OF THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 1220 (5th ed. 1981).
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signor/original lessee remains as a principal obligor with no surety-
ship status,98 except, perhaps, in the "limited sense as between the
assignee and his assignor, but as between the lessor and the lessee
the latter remains a primary obligor under his express contract to
pay rent."9
Generally, decisions declining to recognize the suretyship status
of the assignor/original lessee involve situations in which no special
suretyship defense would have been available in any event. For ex-
ample, in De Hart v. Allen, 00 the lessee rented a rooming house
for a five-year term.10 1 Two years later, the lessee assigned the
lease to one Gammons, who assumed the obligations under the
lease; Gammons abandoned the premises after two months. 2 The
landlord relet the premises and subsequently sued the original
lessee to recover the difference between the rent received and the
rent reserved under the lease.103 The landlord gave notice of the
reletting following Gammons' abandonment to the original les-
see.104 The lessee claimed, inter alia, that failure to give notice of
reletting to the assignee operated as a discharge of the lessee as
surety. 0 5 The court concluded that no such notice was necessary to
preserve the liability of the lessee. 0 6 The court's rationale for this
conclusion was that the lessee was a surety only in a limited
sense-that is, only as between the lessee and the assignee."0 7 This
98. See Meredith v. Dardarian, 147 Cal. Rptr. 761 (Ct. App. 1978); see also infra notes
126-30 and accompanying text (discussing Meredith).
99. De Hart v. Allen, 161 P.2d 453, 455 (Cal. 1945) (citing T.A.D. Jones Co. v.
Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 55 F.2d 944 (D. Conn.), afl'd, 61 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied, 288 U.S. 609 (1933)).
100. 161 P.2d 453.
101. Id. at 454.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 454-55.
105. Id. at 455.
106. Id. at 454-55.
107. Id. at 455; see supra note 99 and accompanying text. See also Broida v. Hayashi, 464
P.2d 285 (Haw. 1970), in which the court held that no duty is imposed on the landlord to
give notice of default to a lessee/assignor. Id. at 289-90. In the absence of such a duty, no
estoppel will be imposed on the landlord attempting to recover from the lessee/assignor. See
id.
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rationale was gratuitous dicta.108 The court should have ruled that
notice to Gammons was unnecessary to preserve the landlord's
right to recover damages from Gammons. 109 Accordingly, any right
of recourse of the defendant against Gammons would not have
been impaired. In any event, the notice given to the defendant was
sufficient under landlord-tenant law to hold the original lessee on
its covenant to pay rent.110
In cases such as De Hart, the lessee/assignor essentially argues
that the mere assignment of the lease with the landlord's consent
operates to release the lessee from further liability;"' however, this
simply is not the law. 1 2 As explained in T.A.D. Jones Co. v.
Winchester Repeating Arms Co.,'" the case relied upon in De
Hart for the proposition that a lessee/assignor is not a surety ex-
cept that in some "limited sense,""' 4 an assignment of lease in
which the assignee assumes the covenants in the lease operates to
change the legal relations of the parties to the lease." 5 The original
lessee, bound by both privity of estate and privity of contract prior
to the assignment, is no longer bound by privity of estate following
the assignment of the lease.1 6 However, in the absence of a nova-
tion or an express release by the landlord, the original lessee re-
mains bound, by privity of contract, under its covenant to pay
rent."
7
108. In the subsequent case of Peiser v. Mettler, 328 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1958), in which the
issue was the appropriate venue of an action against the lessee and its assignee, the court
mischaracterized this dicta as a holding. Id. at 957.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 12.1(3) (1977). Sec-
tion 12.1(3) is further discussed in a comment: "If the tenant has abandoned the leased
property and the landlord stands by and does nothing, the lease is not terminated." Id.
§ 12.1 cmt. i.
110. Id. § 12.1(3)(b).
111. See Broida, 464 P.2d at 287; Kintner v. Harr, 408 P.2d 487, 496 (Mont. 1965); De
Hart, 161 P.2d at 454.
112. See Hamlen v. Rednalloh Co., 197 N.E. 149, 152 (Mass. 1935); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 16.1.
113. 55 F.2d 944 (D, Conn.), afl'd, 61 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 609
(1933).
114. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
115. T.A.D. Jones, 55 F.2d at 947.
116. Id.
117. Id.; see Broida v. Hayashi, 464 P.2d 285, 287 (Haw. 1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 16.1. (1977).
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Notwithstanding the continued liability of the original lessee,
"[o]rdinarily, of course, upon the assignment of an estate for years,
the original lessee becomes a surety for the performance by its as-
signee of the obligation of its covenants, including the covenant to
pay rent.""'  This clear recognition of the assignor's status as a
surety contrasts sharply with the California Supreme Court's reli-
ance on this case for the proposition that the assignor's surety sta-
tus is somehow limited." 9
More fundamental than the propriety of the court's use of this
authority is the determination of what is the "limited sense" in
which the lessee becomes a surety as between itself and the as-
signee. If the lessee/assignor remains a principal obligor vis-a-vis
the landlord, then the limited surety status of the lessee vis-a-vis
the assignee must relate to the lessee's rights against the assignee.
In the first instance, the lessee/assignor would have a direct right
of recourse against the assignee under the contract of assign-
ment.120 Because the assignee has assumed the assignor's obliga-
tions under the prime lease in return for the assignment, the origi-
nal lessee has a direct cause of action to recover for breach of this
promise."' Accordingly, the surety's right of reimbursement is
largely irrelevant, in light of the assignor's direct recourse against
the assignee.
Secondly, a surety's right of exoneration is of minimal, if any,
value to the assignor. Because the landlord has proceeded to col-
lect from the original lessee/assignor under its covenant to pay
rent, the assignor is not in a position to sue the assignee for exon-
eration before the assignor has come out of pocket. Finally, if the
surety relationship is limited to the assignor and the assignee, the
surety's right of subrogation is not implicated. " 'The doctrine of
subrogation is a pure unmixed equity' "122 and applies in any case
"[w]here property of one person is used in discharging an obliga-
tion owed by another or a lien upon the property of another, under
118. T.A.D. Jones, 55 F.2d at 947; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD
AND TENANT § 16.1 cmt. e.
119. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text (discussing De Hart).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 16.1 cmt. c.
121. Id.
122. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 231 (1896) (quoting Gadsden v.
Brown, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 37, 41 (1842)).
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such circumstances that the other would be unjustly enriched by
the retention of the benefit thus conferred.
123
Upon assignment of a lease, the assignee, as between the lessee
and assignee, becomes obligated to perform those covenants of the
lease that touch and concern the leasehold interest, as well as any
other covenants the assignee expressly assumes.'24 Satisfaction of
the assignee's obligation by the assignor results in unjust enrich-
ment of the assignee (who has the benefits of the lease) and, as a
matter of equity, entitles the assignor to be subrogated to the
rights of the obligee/landlord, regardless of any surety relationship
that may exist among the landlord, lessee, and assignee.125
Recognition of the suretyship status of the lessee/assignor only
in the "limited sense" as between the lessee and the assignee is
meaningless. At best, the recourse ostensibly granted to the lessee
against the assignee by such limited suretyship status replicates
the rights the lessee has by the contract of assignment and subro-
gation, irrespective of suretyship status. The mischief wrought by
the De Hart case, however, was brought home in Meredith v.
Dardarian,126 in which the court stated that the defendants, as-
signors of a lease, were not sureties. 27 The court stated that
"[d]espite their assignment, [the original lessees] remain primary
obligors under the terms of the lease.' 12 The court made this as-
sertion notwithstanding its recognition that no special suretyship
defense would have existed in any event. 29 Accordingly, nothing
about the lessee's suretyship status precluded its "primary" re-
sponsibility to the landlord in that case.
123. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1937).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 16.1(2).
125. Id. § 16.1 cmt. c.
126. 147 Cal. Rptr. 761 (Ct. App. 1978).
127. Id. at 763-64.
128. Id. at 763.
129. See id. at 764. After quoting from De Hart, the court stated: "It is thus apparent
that defendants are not entitled to the defense of exoneration of a surety. Such being the
case, even if 'unauthorized extensions of time' were given or modifications to the premises
which could not be restored had occurred, such facts would not constitute a defense."
Id. (emphasis added).
Such events certainly would constitute defenses under the Restatement of Suretyship.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 33 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993); supra note 89.
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It is the very nature of suretyship that the obligee has two
sources to which it may resort for satisfaction of the underlying
obligation. Because the court in Meredith found no facts that
would warrant discharging the surety, even if the original lessee
had been found to be a surety,130 the court had no occasion to de-
clare that, after assignment, lessees remain principal obligors in all
cases.
More recently, in the context of cases discussing restrictions on a
landlord's right to withhold consent to assignment of leases, the
California Supreme Court recognized the assignor's surety status.
In Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.,"3 1 the court held that a land-
lord could not refuse consent to an assignment except on commer-
cially reasonable grounds. 32 In support of its decision, the court
stated that "[t]he lessor's interests are also protected by the fact
that the original lessee remains liable to the lessor as a surety even
if the lessor consents to the assignment and the assignee expressly
assumes the obligations of the lease."' 3
In 1992, the California Supreme Court confirmed the lessee/as-
signor's status as surety. In Carma Developers (California), Inc. v.
Marathon Development California, Inc.,3 the court faced the is-
sue of the validity of a recapture clause permitting the landlord to
terminate the lease upon notice of the lessee's intent to sublet or
assign.13 5 The lease also allowed the lessee to sublet or assign the
lease with the consent of the landlord; upon a proposed subletting
or assignment, the landlord could either terminate the lease (and
with it the lessee's liability) or consent to the sublet or assign-
ment.13 6 The court's principal concern related to the validity of the
termination provision and its possible effect as a forfeiture re-
straint on alienation.137 In concluding that the recapture clause in
this lease was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation, the
court noted:
130. Meredith, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
131. 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).
132. Id. at 842-43.
133. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
134. 826 P.2d 710 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
135. Id. at 712.
136. Id. at 713.
137. Id. at 714.
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Forfeiture restraints are generally viewed more favorably than
comparable disabling restraints .... The reason is obvious. A
disabling restraint binds the lessee to the lease throughout its
term. By contrast, a forfeiture restraint permits the lessee to ex-
tricate itself if a suitable transferee can be found. The lessor
must either approve a proposed transfer, releasing the lessee
from all but surety obligations, or terminate the lease, releasing
the lessee altogether. 38
The import of Kendall and Carma Developers lies in their recogni-
tion that the assignor of a lease assumes a position of surety-not
in a limited sense, as only between assignor and assignee, but in
the full sense, as also applicable to the landlord's rights and re-
course against the lessee/assignor.
In Gholson v. Savin,139 the Ohio Supreme Court cogently ana-
lyzed the relationship of the landlord, tenant, and assignee and
demonstrated the propriety of according suretyship status to the
lessee/assignor.140 In Gholson, the landlord had released the as-
signee upon partial satisfaction of a judgment against the assignee
while continuing to assert a right to recover from the original
lessee the balance of rent outstanding.'4 ' The court held that in
the context of a lease assignment in which the lessee is not ex-
pressly released from his obligations under such lease, the assignee
assumes the position of principal obligor for the performance of
the covenants of the lease, and the lessee becomes his surety for
such performance. 42 This surety relationship results from the
character of the lessee's and assignee's obligations to the landlord/
creditor. 43 The nature of their relationship is such that, upon pay-
ment of the obligation, the lessee is entitled to full reimbursement
and indemnification by the assignee. 44
This results from two key factors. First, at a minimum, a con-
tract of assignment and assumption between the lessee and as-
signee implicitly binds the assignee to the lessee to perform fully
138. Id. at 718 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
139. 31 N.E.2d 858 (Ohio 1941).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 860.
142. Id. at 862.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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the obligations of the covenants in the lease. 145 Second, the as-
signee receives the full benefit of the lease from the moment of the
assignment; 146 accordingly, as between the lessee and the assignee,
the latter ought to bear the full weight of performing the return
consideration, i.e., paying the rent. As discussed earlier, these fac-
tors certainly justify the lessee's direct recourse against the as-
signee via the assignment or by way of subrogation to the land-
lord's rights, irrespective of suretyship principles. 47 However,
when considered in the context of the total relationship among the
lessor, lessee, and assignee, these factors demonstrate the propriety
of granting the lessee/assignor suretyship status against both the
assignee and the landlord.
Although as an original proposition the landlord/obligee has the
right to proceed against either the lessee or the assignee, once the
landlord deals with the assignee in such a way as to recognize the
assignee as the party principally liable for performance of the
lease, that action should bind the landlord in future dealings with
the lessee. In Gholson, the landlord released the assignee from lia-
bility for unpaid rental by accepting less than the full amount ow-
ing.' 48 Once the landlord released his rights against the assignee,
the lessee also lost its right to enforce the lease against the as-
signee, as subrogee of the landlord. 149
Not only is the lessee's right of subrogation adversely affected by
the release, but the assignee does not receive the benefits of the
release. 50
[S]ince the settlement with the principal debtor [assignee] can-
not affect the right of the debtor secondarily liable [the lessee]
to indemnity and reimbursement from his principal, the settle-
ment operates as a fraud against the principal debtor since he
must remain liable for reimbursement to the surety or debtor
secondarily liable. 15'
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 16.1 cmt. c
(1977).
146. See id. § 16.2(2).
147. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
148. Gholson, 31 N.E.2d at 863.
149. Id. at 861.
150. Id. at 861-62.
151. Id.
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Though phrased in the language of suretyship, this fraud on the
assignee becomes clearer upon consideration that, whatever the
impact on the lessee's surety rights of reimbursement, the action of
the landlord in releasing the assignee certainly can have no effect
on the right of the lessee to recover from the assignee under the
direct contract of assignment and assumption. 152
Upon assignment of a lease, or sublease and assumption by the
sublessee, a classic suretyship triangle is created.' 53 Under the
lease, two parties, the assignee and the lessee, owe obligations to
the landlord/obligee. 5  As between these two parties, the as-
signee-the party receiving the benefits of the lease following the
assignment-ought to perform the obligations. 155 Notice of the as-
signment obligates the landlord to recognize the suretyship status
of the former lessee. 56 This situation does not prejudice the land-
lord/obligee because, in addition to receiving notice of the new ar-
rangement before being bound, the landlord must take some action
prejudicial to the lessee/secondary obligor that would give rise to a
suretyship defense. 57 If the landlord takes no such prejudicial ac-
tion, the landlord will retain full recourse against .the lessee/sec-
ondary obligor.15 8
Actions by the landlord that alter or modify the terms of the
lease directly impact the obligations of the original lessee/assignor
under the original lease. Furthermore, the recourse of the assignor
against its assignee, in the event the assignor is called upon to per-
form, may well have been prejudiced by such actions. 5 9 As in the
case of mortgage assignment and assumption, in which the obligee
takes action vis-A-vis- the assignee that prejudicially affects the as-
signor's recourse against the assignee, suretyship principles provide
the assignor with a complete or partial discharge. 160 The result
should be no different simply because the context has changed
152. See id. at 861.
153. See supra part II.
154. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 5, 9-10 and accompanying text.
156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 28(2) & cmts. a-c (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1993).
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 5, 50-51 and accompanying text.
160. See supra part III.A.
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from a mortgagee-assignee relationship to a landlord-assignee rela-
tionship. By taking those actions, the landlord effectively recog-
nizes and deals with the assignee as the principal obligor. There-
fore, it is the actions of the landlord, and not those of the assignor,
which give rise to the suretyship defense.
Upon assignment to an acceptable assignee, the landlord obtains
two obligors for the performance of the lease covenants. Had no
assignment occurred, any change in the terms of the lease would
require the consent of the lessee. 6' Why should the landlord be
allowed to alter the terms of the lease with the assignee without
obtaining the consent of the original lessee, when such consent
clearly would have been required in the absence of an assignment?
Furthermore, if the landlord finds an assignee unacceptable, the
landlord may obtain protection by refusing consent to the assign-
ment on reasonable grounds."6 2 Even if bound to consent to an as-
signment, the landlord can continue to deal with, and look to, the
original tenant for performance. 63 Recognizing suretyship status in
the assignor in no way precludes the landlord from taking this ap-
proach. Only when the landlord by its own actions implicitly recog-
nizes the assignee as the principal obligor does the landlord run
the risk of entirely or partially discharging the original lessee from
liability under the lease.
Whether a lease is treated under rules of contract or property,
the suretyship status of the assignor is recognized by both the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts and the Restatement (Second) of
Property.64 When the lessee assigns the lease to one who agrees to
perform the obligations under the prime lease, the lessor is a third-
party beneficiary of the assignment agreement.1 5 Particularly
when the landlord consents to the assignment, the lessee and as-
signee most likely intend the landlord to have enforceable rights
against the assignee. As an intended beneficiary, the landlord may
recover against either the lessee or the assignee,' subject to the
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 2.2, 2.4 cmt. b
(1977).
162. See id. § 15.2.
163. See id. § 16.1(1) & cmt. c.
164. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. b (1981).
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302.
166. Id. § 310(1).
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rights and defenses of the lessee as surety. 6 ' Similarly, notwith-
standing the continued liability of an assigning lessee under privity
of contract, the landlord is subject to property rules that may
grant the lessee a discharge based upon the landlord's actions in
dealing with the assignee. 16
Acknowledging the suretyship status of an assigning lessee is
consistent with the general rules of suretyship, and-the relation-
ship is recognized as a general matter of contract law and property
law. 6" This status is proper and results in no prejudice to the land-
lord.17 0 The landlord is not bound by such status unless and until
the landlord has notice of the assignment.' 7 ' More importantly, the
landlord will not lose recourse against the original lessee unless the
landlord affirmatively treats the assignee as the principal obligor
under the lease in a manner that is prejudicial to the rights of the
lessee/secondary obligor. 172 Only by the landlord's own conduct,
which demonstrates-explicitly or implicitly-that the landlord
will look to the assignee for principal performance of the lease, and
which prejudicially affects the rights and recourse of the original
lessee, can the landlord lose its rights against the original lessee. 7 3
IV. THE "FRINGE" CASES
Although the application of suretyship principles by operation of
law usually arises in mortgage and lease transactions, as discussed
in Part III, courts have relied upon suretyship principles to resolve
disputes in other circumstances. The following cases present a few
examples of how suretyship principles may be applicable upon in-
depth analysis of the underlying rights and obligations of the par-
ties. The courts in these cases went beyond the facial disputes and
focused on the substantive rights and obligations of the parties.
That focus led to the application of suretyship principles to reach
167. Id. § 314.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 16.1 cmt. e, illus. 17
(1977).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 155-68.
170. See supra text accompanying note 157.
171. See supra text accompanying note 156.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 155-63.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 155-63.
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results consonant with the underlying rights and equities of the
parties.
In Foremost Life Insurance Co. v. Department of Insurance,"4
plaintiff insurance company asserted that it was entitled to prior-
ity in the statutory liquidation of its reinsurer. 175 Under a reinsur-
ance treaty, Keystone Life Insurance Company agreed to adminis-
ter and pay claims under certain life insurance policies written by
Foremost.'76 After Keystone became unable to perform its obliga-
tions under these policies and the Indiana Department of Insur-
ance began liquidation proceedings, Foremost stepped in and paid
claims arising under the existing policies. 17 7 The court noted that,
as to the consumers under these policies, both Keystone and Fore-
most were jointly liable.'17 The court then stated, "As between
Keystone and Foremost, however, a quasi-suretyship arrangement
was created whereby Keystone was ultimately liable to discharge
the claims of policyholders and Foremost acquired the status of
surety. '' 7
9
The court reasoned that this situation was analogous to Indiana
cases holding that the assumption of mortgage indebtedness cre-
ated a principal surety relation between the original mortgagor and
the assuming grantee.'80 Accordingly, the court of appeals held
that Foremost was entitled to be subrogated to the priority status
of those policyholders whose claims it had paid.' 8 ' Foremost is a
174. 395 N.E.2d 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), vacated, 409 N.E.2d 1092 (Ind. 1980). The deci-
sion of the court of appeals was vacated by the Indiana Supreme Court on grounds of statu-
tory interpretation. The supreme court reasoned that the legislature, in adopting the prior-
ity scheme applicable upon insolvency of an insurance company, did not intend to grant
priority to insurance companies, as subrogees of paid policyholders, reinsured by the insol-
vent company. The purpose of the priority granted to policyholders was to protect consum-
ers unable to determine the financial strength of the insurance company. Foremost, 409
N.E.2d at 1096. Companies such as Foremost have the ability to protect their own interests
and so were not intended beneficiaries, via subrogation, of the statutory priority scheme. Id.
at 1096-97.
175. Foremost, 395 N.E.2d at 421.
176. Id. at 422.
177. Id. at 423.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 423-24.
180. Id. at 424.
181. Id. at 424-25. While consistent with suretyship principles, the court of appeals' deci-
sion was vacated on the ground of legislative intent in adopting the priority scheme for
claims against insolvent insurance companies, which scheme did not include claims of so-
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solid example of the application of suretyship principles. Because
the original obligation of Foremost to its policyholders had been
assumed by Keystone through the reinsurance treaty, both Fore-
most and Keystone owed a single obligation to the policyholders/
obligees. 1 2 Yet as between Keystone and Foremost, Keystone had
the principal obligation to satisfy the claims of the policyholders. 183
In Campanella v. Ranier National Bank,8'8 Campanella, the
owner of a hotel, sold the property and took back a deed of trust to
secure the purchase price.185 Campanella's buyer resold the hotel
to Douglas, who intended to remodel the hotel. ' In order to per-
mit Douglas to obtain financing for the remodeling, Campanella
agreed to subordinate the priority of his deed of trust for a period
of one year.1 87 After a number of defaults by Douglas, the financing
mortgagee commenced foreclosure proceedings under its deed of
trust. ' Although foreclosure proceedings were commenced within
one year of the subordination, the actual sale was scheduled be-
yond the one-year period.18 9 After the period of the subordination,
Campanella commenced his own action to foreclose his deed of
trust.'90 The question before the court turned on the timing of the
expiration of the subordination agreement; if the agreement termi-
nated after one year regardless of the commencement of foreclo-
sure proceedings, Campanella's deed of trust would have priority
over the financing mortgagee's deed.19'
phisticated insurance companies as subrogees of unsophisticated policyholders. See supra
note 174. See also American Surety Co. v. Bethlehem Natiohal Bank, 314 U.S. 314 (1941), in
which Justice Douglas noted in dissent:
It is ordinarily true that a surety succeeds to all of the rights and remedies of
the creditor, including the latter's priority. But that is no inexorable rule ...
While a surety was entitled to be subrogated to the rights of a State against an
insolvent bank, the surety did not, in absence of statute, acquire the State's
priority.
Id. at 323-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
182. See Foremost, 395 N.E.2d at 423-24.
183. Id. at 424.
184. 612 P.2d 460 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
185. Id. at 461.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 462.
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The court held that the subordination agreement expired after
one year by its own terms, and accordingly, Campanella reacquired
priority at that time.192 The court's decision was based upon the
following rationale: "The bank's priority rights under a subordina-
tion agreement are strictly limited to the express terms and condi-
tions of the agreement. The rationale behind the rule is that the
owner is a quasi-surety who has pledged his property to the bank
in order to finance a construction loan.' '193
When a person pledges property to secure the debt of another,
the pledgor is deemed a surety to the extent of the property
pledged.9 A subordination agreement can be viewed as an effec-
tive pledge of the subordinating party's priority interest in the
property. In Campanella, the application of suretyship principles
led to the court's applying a form of the doctrine of strictissimi
juris, pursuant to which the court strictly construed the agreement
in favor of the subordinating party and limited the term to one
year. 95
Although the doctrine of strictissimi juris in construing surety-
ship contracts is out of favor, 96 the lesson for counsel in such cases
is that suretyship principles may operate to relieve the subordinat-
ing party of obligations under the subordination agreement. In the
event that the financing bank grants some accommodation to the
obligor without the consent of the subordinating party, the bank
may lose the priority it obtained through the subordination agree-
ment because it may be subject to a suretyship defense available to
the subordinating party. Accordingly, attorneys are well advised to
draft appropriate waiver and consent clauses into such agreements.
Perhaps the most creative application of suretyship principles
arose in Eastwood Apartments, Inc. v. Anderson.19 7 In Anderson,
Eastwood Apartments opposed the City of Rochester's grant of a
192. Id.
193. Id. (citations omitted).
194. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 83(b) (1941); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§§ l(1)(b)(2), 2(c) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
195. See Campanella, 612 P.2d at 462.
196. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 88 & cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 11
& cmt. c (Tent. Draft No. 1); see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Borden Metal
Prods. Co., 539 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (reluctantly following strictissimi juris
after stating a preference to adopt the majority position).
197. 266 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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variance to a building supply company.198 The building supply
company objected to Eastwood Apartments' status as a proper
party to raise such an objection because Eastwood was not a "per-
son aggrieved" under the applicable zoning statute.1 99 In order to
be a "person aggrieved" with standing to object to such a variance,
"[t]here must be special injury or damage to one's personal or
property rights as distinguished from the role of being only a
champion of causes."200
Eastwood did not own the property that allegedly was adversely
affected by the granting of the variance.2 0' Rather, Eastwood had
purchased the property with a loan secured by a mortgage and
then immediately conveyed the property (subject to the mortgage)
to its principal shareholders, who effectively had agreed to assume
the mortgage.202 As a result of the transfer subject to the mortgage,
the court concluded that "either as surety or as one having 'the
equities of a surety' by virtue of being a mortgagor, [Eastwood] has
shown itself to be a person 'aggrieved' within the purview of said
statute."
20 3
Application of the mortgagor suretyship rules resulted in recog-
nition of rights in the surety outside the normal ken of suretyship
law; the result nonetheless appears appropriate. Eastwood, as
surety, had recourse to the secured property in the event the bank
called upon Eastwood to satisfy its secondary obligation.0 4 As a
result, any factors affecting the value of the land impacted the
surety's ability to recover. For that reason, a surety and an owner
of property that may be adversely affected by a variance grant
should be equally entitled to oppose that variance.
V. CONCLUSION
Surety relationships do not always arise through transactions de-
nominated "guaranty" or "suretyship." When an obligee to whom
another owes performance of an obligation agrees to a third-party
198. Id. at 198.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 199 (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 200.
202. Id. at 199-200.
203. Id. at 201 (quoting Murray v. Marshall, 94 N.Y. 611, 615 (1884)).
204. Id. at 200.
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assumption of the existing obligor's obligation (whether that obli-
gation is also secured by property security or not), the obligee
must be aware of the possibility that subsequent actions in dealing
with the new obligor may operate to release the original obligor. As
the saying goes, "Forewarned is forearmed." By being aware of the
potential downside to the assumption (i.e., the discharge, in whole
or in part, of the original obligor), the obligee can protect itself by
obtaining appropriate waivers and consents from the original obli-
gor and/or secondary obligor-either as part of the original trans-
action or as a condition to consenting to the assignment.
In the absence of waiver or consent, when confronted with an
obligee's demand for performance, the original obligor must also
realize that it has potential rights against the assuming principal
obligor, as well as defenses against the obligee. Some of the obli-
gor's rights may be important in ways not readily apparent; for
example, the obligor may have legally protected rights in property.
In short, it is essential that whenever two or more parties are
obligated on a single obligation, the parties must carefully scruti-
nize the situation to determine whether suretyship principles may
be applicable. In the case of the obligee, this analysis ideally occurs
prior to the inception of a given transaction so that appropriate
steps may be taken to protect the obligee's rights, regardless of fu-
ture occurrences. In the case of the secondary obligor, or potential
secondary obligor, such analysis will normally take place at the
time that demand for performance occurs or recourse against the
principal obligor is sought. In sum, the parties should be aware of
the potential applicability of suretyship principles and should pro-
ceed accordingly.
Considering the myriad transactions to which principles of sure-
tyship may apply, the scope of the proposed Restatement (Third)
of Suretyship becomes perhaps its single most important feature.
The increasing complexity and sophistication of the players in to-
day's business world suggests that multiparty transactions involv-
ing assignments and assumptions of obligations will not diminish.
Consequently, the question of whether the rules set forth in the
Restatement will apply in the first instance takes on larger signifi-
cance. In any event, the current provisions of the Restatement of
Suretyship clearly set forth the proper scope for the applicability
of suretyship principles.
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